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I. INTRODUCTION
THE COURT: It says, "Intoxication itself is not a defense to the prosecution for an
offense. However, intoxication, while voluntary or involuntary, is admissible in
evidence if it is relevant to negate a culpable mental state." Now what does that
mean?
MR. TATUM: Your Honor, that only goes to show-if this jury finds that Mr.
Wagner was voluntarily intoxicated, they could find from that that he did not act
knowingly under the applicable statutes ....
THE COURT: You mean that a man can get so drunk, if he's walking down the
street and then he blacks out, and then he gets in a car and drives it and kills
somebody, he's not guilty of vehicular homicide because he didn't-he was so
drunk he couldn't appreciate what happened? Is that what you're saying?'
Although the voluntary and involuntary intoxication de-
fenses remain alive in a majority of American jurisdictions, 2 their
health appears questionable. Frequently reviled, often just misun-
derstood, 3 the intoxication defenses have become an increasingly
endangered species within the American criminal law landscape,
threatening soon to go the way of the dinosaur. Although the volun-
1. This dialogue reflects a conversation between the trial judge and the defendant's attor-
ney, R. at 331-34, Tennessee v. Wagner, C.C.A. No. 02C01o-9809-CC-00264, 1999 Tenn. Crim.
App. LEXIS 1344 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 30, 1999) (No. 96-228).
2. See Mitchell Keiter, Just Say No Excuse: The Rise and Fall of the Intoxication Defense,
87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 482, 518-20 (1997) (providing a comprehensive listing of states
that recognize the voluntary intoxication defense); see also PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW
DEFENSES § 65(a)(1) & n.4 (1984) (discussing availability of the involuntary intoxication de-
fense).
3. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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tary and the involuntary intoxication defenses are similar in many
ways, each faces a unique threat to its continued existence.
The ever-controversial voluntary intoxication defense faces
possible elimination by statutory abrogation. Originally developed
by nineteenth-century common law courts, 4 the defense5 recognizes
that an intoxicated 6 defendant may be incapable of possessing the
mens rea 7 specified by an offense. 8 Increasingly criticized in recent
4. See, e.g., Chad J. Layton, Note, No More Excuses: Closing the Door on the Voluntary In-
toxication Defense, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 535, 537 (1997).
5. The term "voluntary intoxication deiense" can be a misnomer. See JOSHUA DRESSLER,
UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 293 n.4 (2d ed. 1995). Rather than exculpating a defendant's
criminal conduct, voluntary intoxication evidence generally will only mitigate the offense by
negating a specific mental state, i.e., reducing an intentional assault charge to a reckless assault
conviction. See id. at 306. Intoxication never actually justifies the defendant's actions; however,
in some extreme cases, it may be introduced as an excuse for the defendant's conduct, similar to
insanity. See id. at 302-03.
6. Although the effects of alcohol vary among users and the legally defining characteristics
of the inebriate appear to vary among jurisdictions, see generally infra Part V, the following list
offers an estimate of the physical effects of certain blood alcohol concentrations ("BAC"):
0.05 BAC Some minor impairment of reasoning and memory. Behavior may
become exaggerated and emotions are intensified. (Approximately
two drinks for a 160-pound man)
0.10 BAC Significant impairment of motor coordination and loss of good
judgment. This is the level of legal intoxication in most states.
(Approximately four drinks for a 160-pound man)
0.12 BAC Vomiting usually occurs. (Approximately five drinks for a 160-
pound man)
0.15 BAC Gross motor impairment and lack of physical control. Euphoria
is reduced and dysphoria (anxiety, restlessness) is beginning to
appear. (Approximately six drinks for a 160-pound man)
0.20 BAC Feeling dazed and disoriented. May need help to stand or walk.
Blackouts are likely at this level. (Approximately eight drinks
for a 160-pound man)
0.25 BAC All mental, physical and sensory functions are severely impaired.
Increased risk of serious injury through falls, accidents or chok-
ing on vomit. (Approximately ten to eleven drinks for a 160-
pound man)
0.30 BAC Stupor. The intoxicated person has little comprehension of
where he is.
0.35 BAC Coma is possible. This is the level of surgical anesthesia.
0.40 & up Onset of coma and possible death.
See Be Responsible About Drinking, Inc., Estimated BAC Information, at
http://www.brad2l.org/bac-charts.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2002); Be Responsible About Drink-
ing, Inc., Effects At Specific B.A.C. Levels (related to the Blood Alcohol Concentration (BAC)), at
http://www.brad2l.org/effects-at-specificbac.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2002); SpeedImpact.org,
Blood Alcohol Concentration (BAC) Levels and Effects!, at http://www.speed-
impact.org/alc.fx.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2002). Although this chart deals solely with the
effects of alcohol, the intoxication defenses also encompass intoxication through ingestion of
drugs. See Ashaki Fitzpatrick, Erosion of the Right to Put on a Defense: The Disallowance of Use
of Voluntary Intoxication Evidence in Criminal Defenses, 1998 DET. C.L. MICH. ST. U. L. REV.
1240, 1241-42.
7. The mens rea ("guilty mind") is the mental state, or intent, required to accompany a
criminal act. SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 217 (5th ed. 1989).
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years,9 the defense received a substantial blow to its continued vi-
tality in the 1996 Supreme Court decision Montana v. Egelhoff.10 In
a sharply divided opinion," a plurality of the Court held that a de-
fendant does not possess a constitutional right to present evidence
of voluntary intoxication in his defense. 12 The Egelhoff decision has
caused much commentary, both positive and negative, from legal
scholars and practitioners. 13 In its wake, a number of states have
proposed or adopted statutes banning the use of the voluntary in-
toxication defense. 14
The involuntary intoxication defense 15 faces a slower de-
mise-a long descent into legal irrelevancy. The involuntary intoxi-
cation defense typically entitles a defendant to acquittal when his
intoxication came about in a nonculpable manner. 16 Currently, it
remains available in every jurisdiction, 17 at least in theory, and has
8. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW 473 (1978).
9. See generally Keiter, supra note 2 (detailing various criticisms leveled at the defense by
those who feel that it protects intoxicated defendants at the expense of their innocent victims);
Layton, supra note 4 (same).
10. 518 U.S. 37, 56 (1996).
11. Four Justices dissented (Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, and Breyer); three of them filed
separate dissenting opinions. See id. at 38. In a dissenting opinion joined by the other three,
Justice O'Connor argued that "[tlhe Montana statute places a blanket exclusion on a category of
evidence that would allow the accused to negate the offense's mental-state element. In so doing,
it frees the prosecution, in the face of such evidence, from having to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant nevertheless possessed the required mental state. In my view, this
combination of effects violates due process." Id. at 62 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
12. See id at 38.
13. Compare Derrick Augustus Carter, Bifurcations of Consciousness: The Elimination of
the Self-Induced Intoxication Excuse, 64 MO. L. REV. 383, 434-36 (1999) (arguing that "[a]lcohol
must be treated as a dangerous instrument .... and that "[dlespite the historical concessions to
alcohol within the American way of life, there must be personal accountability"), with Fitz-
patrick, supra note 6, at 1261 (contending that "[i]f defendants are prevented from putting evi-
dence of voluntary intoxication before the jury, then the compulsory process right to present
evidence is stifled, and the ability to move forward in the adversary process is obstructed").
14. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.051 (West 2000) (abolishing the defense in 1999); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.21(C) (West 1997 & Supp. 2000) (barring the defense in 2000). California
State Senator Ray Haynes introduced a bill to ban the defense in 1998 and in 1999; thus far, he
has met with little success. See California State Senate Republican Caucus, End the Voluntary
Intoxication Defense, at http://republican.senate.ca.gov/opeds/36/oped114.asp (Jan. 22, 1999)
(editorial by Sen. Ray Haynes).
15. Unlike voluntary intoxication, involuntary intoxication can be accurately described as a
"defense." See supra note 5. Generally, an involuntarily intoxicated defendant will be entitled to
acquittal. See DRESSLER, supra note 5, at 305.
16. A "nonculpable" manner is defined differently by various jurisdictions but generally in-
cludes the following: coerced intoxication, fraudulently induced intoxication, intoxication from
prescription medicine, and pathological intoxication. See ROBINSON, supra note 2, § 65(g).
17. Id. § 65(a)(1). In drawing this conclusion, Robinson notes that many states' criminal
statutes are silent regarding the availability of the involuntary intoxication defense; however, he
concludes that where there are express provisions limiting the use of the voluntary intoxication
610
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been unimpaired by the Egelhoff holding.18 Despite the involuntary
intoxication defense's apparent viability, it has been observed that,
if one were to judge the state of the law from court opinions, the
involuntary intoxication defense is "simply and completely non-
existent."19
Ensuring the survival of the intoxication defenses may justi-
fiably be seen as a questionable cause to champion. As one law stu-
dent observed, "Even with my limited experience in the law, I know
that presenting a defense like 'My client was too drunk so he
shouldn't be criminally liable' is not the most palatable option for a
case." 20 Yet, is it wise to allow our society's distaste for intoxicated
offenders to abridge the basic right to present a defense? As cur-
rently formulated and applied, the intoxication defenses are prob-
lematic; however, revision, not abolition, should be the judicial and
legislative response.
Part II of this Note discusses the genesis and subsequent
history of the intoxication defenses. Part III explains the two pri-
mary versions of both the voluntary and involuntary intoxication
defenses, and describes criticisms of each defense. Part IV examines
various factors that may contribute to the current backlash against
the intoxication defense. Part V examines the often problematic ap-
plication of the intoxication defenses, showing how judges and ju-
ries may be effectively interpreting the defenses out of existence.
Finally, Part VI proposes a statutory revision designed to better
meet the goals of the intoxication defense.
II. THE TURBULENT HISTORY OF THE INTOXICATION
DEFENSES
Perhaps more than any other criminal defenses, the viability
of the intoxication defenses have been subject to the shifting whims
of society. In Egelhoff, the Supreme Court rejected a due process
argument for requiring the admission of intoxication evidence. 21
The Egelhoff Court concluded that, although the voluntary intoxica-
tion defense had gained validity in American criminal jurispru-
dence at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment's ratification, its
defense, a state code's silence regarding the involuntary intoxication defense will be construed to
indicate its availability. Id. at § 65(a)(1) n.4.
18. See id. (Supp. 2001).
19. JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 539 (2d ed. 1960).
20. Alexey Y. Kaplunov, Disproving Criminal Intent with a Shot Glass, CHI. DAILY L. BULL.,
Dec. 29, 1998, at 5.
21. See 518 U.S. 37, 56 (1996).
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checkered past and controversial present has barred it from consid-
eration as a "fundamental principle of justice."22 Some legal com-
mentators have taken issue with the Supreme Court's brusque dis-
missal of the historical significance of this defense, noting that it
has existed in the United States, in some form, for nearly two cen-
turies. 23 This debate regarding the intoxication defense's "funda-
mental" nature merely represents the latest skirmish in a long legal
war over the significance of intoxication evidence.
A. The Voluntary Intoxication Defense in Early English Common
Law
At early English common law, the courts allowed no mitiga-
tion to a voluntarily intoxicated offender. 24 In Reniger v. Fogossa, a
1551 English case currently enjoying renewed attention thanks to
Justice Scalia's reliance upon its "fundamental" principles in Egel-
hoff, it was observed:
[I]f a person that is drunk kills another, this shall be Felony, and he shall be
hanged for it, and yet he did it through Ignorance, for when he was drunk he had
no Understanding nor Memory; but inasmuch as that Ignorance was occasioned by
his own Act and Folly, and he might have avoided it, he shall not be privileged
thereby. 2
5
Some commentators believed that, rather than mitigating an of-
fense, a defendant's voluntary intoxication should actually aggra-
vate it. 26 The English courts' stern rejection of the voluntary intoxi-
22. See id. at 43-48 (tracing the history of the voluntary intoxication defense in England and
the United States, and concluding that "[i]nstead of the uniform and continuing acceptance we
would expect for a rule that enjoys 'fundamental principle' status, we find that fully one-fifth of
the States either never adopted the 'new common law' rule at issue here or have recently aban-
doned it").
23. Fitzpatrick, supra note 6, at 1254-55 (noting that the "voluntary intoxication defense
[first] graced American criminal law in the nineteenth century" and "great weight must be given
to the continuous duration of its existence and the fact that forty states currently permit use of
the defense"). In an article assessing the intoxication defenses, written fifty years prior to Egel-
hoff, Professor Jerome Hall observed that even early English opponents of the voluntary intoxi-
cation defense experienced misgivings regarding a hard line ban on intoxication evidence.
Jerome Hall, Intoxication and Criminal Responsibility, 57 HARV. L. REV. 1045, 1048 (1944).
According to Hall, these doubts were "reflected in mitigating doctrines left at odds with counter-
vailing legal principles." Id.
24. See, e.g., Carter, supra note 13, at 383; R.U. Singh, History of the Defence of Drunken-
ness in English Criminal Law, 49 LAW. Q. REV. 528, 530 (1933); see also Reniger v. Fogossa, 75
Eng. Rep. 1 (K.B. 1551) (approving death sentence for an extremely intoxicated offender).
25. See 518 U.S. at 45 (alteration in original) (quoting Reniger, 75 Eng. Rep. at 31).
26. See id. at 44 (citing 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *25-26 for authority). But see
Hall, supra note 23, at 1046 (stating that Coke's and Blackstone's efforts to make inebriation an
aggravating factor "met with no success"). In a 1933 article surveying the English history of the
612 [Vol. 55:607
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cation defense has been variously described as arising from the
Enlightenment assumption that people are "rational agents moti-
vated by self-interest"27 or, less benignly, as the product of a legal
system that restricted a defendant's ability to call witnesses and
present evidence. 28
B. The Evolution of the Voluntary Intoxication Defense in America
Early American courts initially followed England's strict ban
on-the voluntary intoxication defense. 29 The 1847 American edition
of Matthew Hale's Pleas of the Crown stated: " 'Drunkenness...
can never be received as a ground to excuse or palliate an offence:
this is not merely the opinion of a speculative philosopher, the ar-
gument of counsel, or the obiter dictum of a single judge, but it is a
sound and long established maxim of judicial policy .... '"30 Early
American judges expressed disdain for intoxicated offenders, em-
bodied by the oft-quoted observation of Justice Story who, upon re-
jecting a party's intoxication evidence, noted: " 'This is the first
time, that I ever remember it to have been contended, that the
commission of one crime was an excuse for another. Drunkenness is
a gross vice ... '"31
By the late nineteenth century, however, judicial attitudes
towards intoxication had begun to shift. A new "scientific" school of
thought, which attributed criminal behavior to biological and envi-
ronmental factors, began to replace the classical view that crimi-
nals were merely sinful and selfish individuals. 32 This revised out-
look evoked increased sympathy for intoxicated offenders. In the
1819 case of King v. Grindley, an English court recognized that in-
toxication might serve as a defense to crimes requiring specific in-
tent.33 Eventually, the majority of American courts also allowed a
intoxication defenses, R.U. Singh concluded that it would be difficult to determine whether, in
actual practice of law, drunkenness ever served to aggravate an offense because there were sim-
ply no English cases on point. Singh, supra note 24, at 531.
27. Keiter, supra note 2, at 485-86.
28. See Kyndra K. Miller, Note, Criminal Law-Intoxication as a Defense: The Drunk and
Dangerous Model, 33 LAND & WATER L. REV. 749, 751 (1998).
29. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick, supra note 6, at 1243.
30. See id. (quoting 1 MATTHEW HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN *32 n.33).
31. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. at 44 (quoting United States v. Cornell, 25 F. Cas. 650, 657-58
(C.C.R.I. 1820) (Story, J.)); Carter, supra note 13, at 383 n.3.
32. Keiter, supra note 2, at 486.
33. Miller, supra note 28, at 751-52 (citing King v. Grindley, Worcester Sum: Assizes 1819
MS). But see Singh, supra note 24, at 537 (reporting that Grindley was overruled in the 1835
case King v. Carroll and that the judge in Carroll declared that "there would be no safety for
human life if [Grindley's rule] were to be considered as law").
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voluntary intoxication defense to criminal charges that required a
specific intent.34
The 1960s and 1970s constituted the heyday of the voluntary
intoxication defense.3 5 In 1956, the American Medical Association
officially recognized alcoholism as a disease, thus providing support
for the theory that voluntary intoxication was actually, in a sense,
"involuntary" and more similar to mental illness than to criminal
behavior. 36 Two federal circuit courts compared punishing an alco-
holic's drinking to punishing an insane person, an infant, or a
leper.3 7 Legal commentators agreed, advocating leniency for intoxi-
cated offenders with arguments such as: "If a man is punished for
doing something when drunk that he would not have done when
sober, is he not in plain truth punished for getting drunk?"3 8
Unfortunately, the rise of the voluntary intoxication defense
appeared to coincide with an increasing crime rate.39 Statistics be-
gan to show a strong correlation between violent crime and self-
induced intoxication. Inebriated offenders were implicated in fifty
percent of homicides, sixty-two percent of aggravated assaults, and
fifty percent of spousal abuses, rapes, and property offenses. 40 A
34. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 6, at 1244. "Crimes requiring specific intent include bur-
glary, assault with intent to rape, robbery, kidnapping, felonious escape, automobile theft, for-
gery, larceny, murder, assault with the intent to murder, and various other crimes." Id. at 1244
n.20 (relying upon 5 AM. JUR. 2d Proof ofFacts § 4 (1994)). In the 1870 case Roberts v. Michigan,
the Supreme Court of Michigan explained this new voluntary intoxication rule as follows:. ,
[Tihe jury should have been instructed, that if his mental faculties were so far
overcome by the intoxication, that he was not conscious of what he was doing,
or if he did know what he was doing, but did not know why he was doing it, or
that his actions and the means he was using were naturally adapted or calcu-
lated to endanger life or produce death; then he had not sufficient capacity to
entertain the intent, and in that event they could not infer that intent from his
acts. But if he knew what he was doing, why he was doing it, and that his ac-
tions with the means he was using were naturally adapted or likely to kill, then
the intent to kill should be inferred from his acts in the same manner and to
the same extent as if he was sober.
19 Mich. 401, 418-19 (Mich. 1870).
35. See generally Keiter, supra note 2, at 486-92; Miller, supra note 28, at 752.
36. See Keiter, supra note 2, at 486.
37. See id. The Supreme Court reined in this trend toward leniency in Powell v. Texas, 392
U.S. 514 (1968), holding that the Eighth Amendment did not prevent states from criminalizing
public intoxication. See Keiter, supra note 2, at 487.
38. See GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART 564 (2d ed. 1961).
39. See Keiter, supra note 2, at 489-92 & n.53 (citing RUTH MASTERS & CLIFF ROBERSON,
INSIDE CRIMINOLOGY 43 (1990)).
40. See Carter, supra note 13, at 384-85 (referring to statistics provided in Robert A. Moore,
Legal Responsibility and Chronic Alcoholism, 122 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 748 (1966) and Note, Alco-
hol Abuse and the Law, 95 HARv. L. REV. 1660, 1681-82 (1981)). A 1998 study by the U.S. Dep't
of Justice reported similar alcohol/crime correlations. See Lawrence A. Greenfeld, An Analysis of
National Data on the Prevalence of Alcohol Involvement in Crime, NCJ-168632, available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/ascii/ac.txt (Apr. 5-7, 1998, rev. Apr. 28, 1998).
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study of convicted homicide offenders showed that the typical in-
toxicated killer consumed approximately eighteen drinks before
committing the crime. 41 Courts began to question whether alcohol-
ics were truly powerless in regulating their consumption. 42 Concern
for victims of the intoxicated offender began to override any concern
for the offender himself. As one commentator noted, "Legislatures
have since been more inclined to see inebriated killers as killers
rather than as inebriates." 43
C. The Egelhoff Case
In 1987, in response to renewed concerns regarding intoxi-
cated offenders, the Montana legislature amended a criminal stat-
ute that had allowed consideration of voluntary intoxication evi-
dence in crimes requiring a specific intent.44 The revised statute
stipulated: " 'A person who is in an intoxicated condition is crimi-
nally responsible for his conduct and an intoxicated condition is not
a defense to any offense and may not be taken into consideration in
determining the existence of a mental state which is an element of
the offense unless the defendant proves that he did not know that it
was an intoxicating substance when he consumed, smoked, sniffed,
injected or otherwise ingested the substance causing the condi-
tion.' "45
In the landmark case of Montana v. Egelhoff, a plurality of
the U:S. Supreme Court upheld the validity of this revised stat-
ute. 46 Rejecting the defendant's constitutional challenge, the Court
concluded that the Due Process Clause did not require the admis-
sion of voluntary intoxication evidence. 47 Fourteen other states
have adopted the Montana approach to voluntary intoxication, ei-
ther by common law48 or by statute. 49 Legislators in other states
41. See Miller, supra note 28, at 752.
42. See Keiter, supra note 2, at 491.
43. Id.
44. Miller, supra note 28, at 750 n.18.
45. See id. (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-203 (1997)).
46. 518 U.S. 37, 56 (1996).
47. See id.
48. Mississippi and South Carolina courts have ruled to exclude evidence of intoxication
under common law. See McDaniel v. Mississippi, 356 So. 2d 1151, 1161 (Miss. 1978); South Caro-
lina v. Vaughn, 232 S.E. 2d 328, 330 (S.C. 1977).
49. State legislatures in Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho,
Indiana, Missouri, Montana, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Texas have passed statutes barring the ad-
mission of voluntary intoxication evidence. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-503 (West 2001); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 5-2-207 (1999); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 421 (1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.051
(2000); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-4(c) (1999); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §702-230(1) (Michie 1999);
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have also introduced bills that would ban the defense of voluntary
intoxication.5 0
D. The Involuntary Intoxication Defense
Unlike the more controversial voluntary intoxication de-
fense, the involuntary intoxication defense enjoyed early recogni-
tion in Anglo-American common law. 51 In an 1835 action entitled
Pearson's Case, an English court held, "If a party be made drunk by
stratagem, or the fraud of another, he is not responsible. ' 52 This
rule also extended to intoxication that resulted from a physician's
lack of skill in prescribing medications. 53 Currently, American
courts generally recognize the defense when the defendant's intoxi-
cation is the result of coercion, 54 fraud,55 an unexpected effect from
prescription medication,5 6 or "pathological intoxication. '" 57 According
to one commentator, however, a survey of case law reveals few ex-
amples where the involuntary intoxication defense has been effec-
tively employed. 58
IDAO CODE § 18-116 (Michie 1997); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-3-5 (Michie 1998); Mo. REV. STAT. §
562.076(1) (1999); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-203 (2001); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.21(C)
(West 1997 & Supp. 2000); OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 21, § 153 (West 1987); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 8.04(a) (Vernon 1994).
50. See California State Senate Republican Caucus, supra note 14.
51. See Singh, supra note 24, at 533.
52. Hall, supra note 23, at 1054-55 (quoting Pearson's Case, 168 Eng. Rep. 1108 (N.P.
1835)).
53. Id. at 1055.
54. Burrows v. Arizona, 297 P. 1029, 1031 (Ariz. 1931) (concerning young man who is told
that he will be left in the desert if he does not drink alcohol), overruled on other grounds by Ari-
zona v. Hernandez, 320 P.2d 467, 469 (1958). Although Burrows is sometimes cited as an exam-
ple of coerced involuntary intoxication, see BASSIOUNI, supra note 8, at 475 n.136, the young
defendant in Burrows was not relieved of responsibility for murder based on his intoxication, 297
P. at 1034.
55. Illinois v. Penman, 110 N.E. 894, 898 (Ill. 1915) (concerning defendant who was told
that cocaine tablet was a breath freshener).
56. Kelly v. Salt Lake City Civil Serv. Comm'n, 8 P.3d 1048, 1050 (Utah Ct. App. 2000)
(concerning police officer who exhibited bizarre behavior after taking prescription sleep aid).
57. Minnesota v. Martin, 591 N.W.2d 481, 486 (Minn. 1999). The term "pathological intoxi-
cation" or "pathological alcohol reaction" has .een defined as "[a]n extraordinarily severe re-
sponse to alcohol, especially to small amounts, marked by apparently senseless violent behavior,
usually followed by exhaustion, sleep, and amnesia for the episode." Robert J. Pandina, Idiosyn-
cratic Alcohol Intoxication: A Construct that Has Lost Its Validity?, in EXPLORATIONS IN
CRIMINAL PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 142, 143 (Louis B. Schlesinger ed., 1996) (quoting MARK KELLER
ET AL., A DICTIONARY OF WORDS ABOUT ALCOHOL 189 (1982)). The actual existence of this phe-
nomenon has been often questioned by the medical and scientific communities. Id. at 142.
58. Hall, supra note 23, at 1056 (stating that while it is hazardous to generalize concerning
an enormous body of law, "the reports record hardly a single decision actually holding that the
defendant was involuntarily intoxicated"); see also DRESSLER, supra note 5, at 304 (calling Hall's
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III. FORMULATIONS OF THE INTOXICATION DEFENSES
Currently, the voluntary intoxication defense remains avail-
able in thirty-five states. United States jurisdictions employ two
primary formulations of the voluntary intoxication defense: the spe-
cific-intent version and the Model Penal Code (MPC) version. 59 The
involuntary intoxication defense remains available in every state. 6
A. The Specific-Intent Version of the Voluntary Intoxication Defense
First recognized in the 1819 English case King v. Grindley,6'
the "specific-intent" formulation of the voluntary intoxication de-
fense remains the version of choice for a majority of states.62 This
formulation of the defense generally states that a person is not
guilty of a crime if, as the result of his intoxication at the time of
the offense, he was incapable of forming, or in fact did not form, the
specific intent 63 required by the statutory definition of the offense. 64
assessment an "exaggeration," but admitting that cases of involuntary intoxication are "exceed-
ingly uncommon"). Hall posited that current judicial standards for "involuntary" intoxication
were unduly restrictive, noting that:
[F]raud, narrowly interpreted in these cases to require complete innocence of
the nature of alcoholic drink, wrongfully induced, cannot be perpetrated even
on normal children .... As regards "coercion," the caselaw implies that a per-
son would need to be bound hand and foot, and the liquor literally poured down
his throat, or that he would have to be threatened with immediate serious in-
jury, before the exception, so universally voiced, would have any effect on judi-
cial decision.
Hall, supra note 23, at 1056.
59. See Keiter, supra note 2, at 492.
60. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
61. See supra note 33.
62. Twenty-two states admit intoxication as a defense only for crimes requiring a "specific
intent." See CAL. PENAL CODE § 22 (West 2001); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-804(1) (2001); 720
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/6-3(a) (West 2001); IOWA CODE ANN. § 701.5 (2001); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
21-3208(2) (2000); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:15(2) (2001); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.075 (2001);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §193.220 (Michie 2001); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-5-5 (Michie 2001);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-503 (2000); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-306 (2001); WASH. REV. CODE §
9A.16.090 (2001); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-202(a) (Michie 2001); Hook v. Maryland, 553 A.2d 233,
236 (Md. 1989); Massachusetts v. Troy, 540 N.E.2d 162, 166-67 (Mass. 1989); Michigan v. Lang-
worthy, 331 N.W.2d 171, 172-75 (Mich. 1982); Nebraska v. Lesiak, 449 N.W.2d 550, 552 (Neb.
1989); New Mexico v. Tapia, 466 P.2d 551, 552-53 (N.M. 1970); North Carolina v. White, 229
S.E.2d 152, 157 (N.C. 1976); Rhode Island v. Sanden, 626 A.2d 194, 199 (R.I. 1993); Vermont v.
D'Amico, 385 A.2d 1082, 1084 (Vt. 1978); West Virginia v. Keeton, 272 S.E.2d 817, 820 (W.Va.
1980); see also Keiter, supra note 2, at 519-20 (providing a similar list of jurisdictions employing
the specific intent formulation of the voluntary intoxication defense).
63. Criminal offenses are generally classified as requiring either a "general intent" or a
"specific intent." See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 403 (1980). Unfortunately, as
the Supreme Court noted in Bailey, the terms "general intent" and "specific intent" have not been
clearly defined:
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In this context, the "specific intent" element means that, in addition
to proving that the defendant committed a certain act (e.g., assault
or breaking and entering), the prosecution must also prove that he
did it with the intent to cause a particular result (e.g., breaking and
entering with the intent to commit a felony therein).65
Among states adhering to the specific-intent version of the
voluntary intoxication defense, there is a significant difference be-
tween statutes stipulating that the defendant must be "incapable of
forming" the specific intent and statutes that merely require a de-
termination that the defendant "did not form" the specific intent.66
Professor Joshua Dressler explains this distinction by observing
that acquittal should be more difficult to obtain in an "incapacity"
jurisdiction because intoxication seldom renders a person incogni-
zant to such a degree that he is incapable of forming an intention. 67
Dressler disfavors the "incapacity" language because it allows a
jury to convict when "it determines that the defendant had the ca-
pacity to form the specific intent, without resolving the pertinent
question-did the defendant form the intent?"68
Although the specific-intent rule is the oldest formulation of
the voluntary intoxication defense, it is likely the most problematic.
Commentators have called the distinction between general- and
specific-intent crimes "an irrational anachronism, '" 69 and have criti-
cized the application of this formula as "illogical, inconsistent, and
inequitable." 70 Critics of this version of the voluntary intoxication
defense point out that there is often no substantial difference be-
tween the nature of general- and specific-intent offenses; therefore,
application of the defense frequently hinges on the vagaries of legis-
Sometimes "general intent" is used in the same way as "criminal intent" to
mean the general notion of mens rea, while "specific intent" is taken to mean
the mental state required for a particular crime. Or, "general intent" may be
used to encompass all forms of the mental state requirement, while "specific in-
tent" is limited to the one mental state of intent. Another possibility is that
"general intent" will be used to characterize an intent to do something on an
undetermined occasion, and "specific intent" to denote an intent to do that
thing at a particular time and place.
Id. (quoting WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 28 (1972)).
For a list of offenses that are typically classified as "specific intent" crimes, see supra note 34.
64. See Carter, supra note 13, at 409.
65. See id. at 405.
66. See DRESSLER, supra note 5, at 298-99 n.37.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Miller, supra note 28, at 756.
70. Carter, supra note 13, at 411.
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lative language choices. 71 In New Jersey v. Stasio, the New Jersey
Supreme Court discussed the sometimes irrational results of the
specific-intent rule, noting: "[W]here the . . .offense requires only
general intent, such as rape, intoxication provides no defense,
whereas it would be a defense to an attempt to rape, specific intent
being an element of that offense. Yet the same logic and reasoning
which compels exculpation due to the failure of specific intent to
commit an offense would equally compel the same result when a
general intent is an element of the offense." 72
B. The Model Penal Code Version of the Voluntary Intoxication
Defense
Widespread dissatisfaction with the specific-intent formula-
tion of the voluntary intoxication defense led to the creation of a
new version of the defense that does not distinguish between gen-
eral and specific-intent crimes. 73 Under the MPC rule, a defendant
is not guilty of the offense charged if he lacked the state of mind
71. Miller, supra note 28, at 756. The Florida Supreme Court's statutory analysis in Frey v.
Florida clearly illustrates this problem. 708 So. 2d 918 (Fla. 1998). In Frey, the defendant was
convicted of "aggravated battery on a law enforcement officer" and "resisting arrest with vio-
lence." Id. at 919. On appeal, he argued that "resisting arrest with violence" was a specific-intent
crime and that his requested instruction on voluntary intoxication should have been given. Id.
Even though "aggravated battery on a law enforcement officer" had been classified as a specific-
intent crime, the court concluded that "resisting arrest with violence" was a general-intent crime
because the statute stated that " '[w]hoever knowingly and willfully resists, obstructs, or opposes
any officer ... in the lawful execution of any legal duty, by offering or doing violence to the per-
son of such officer ... is guilty of a felony of the third degree...'" Id. at 919-20 (quoting FLA.
STAT. Ch. 843.01 (1993). The court noted that "resisting arrest with violence" would be a specific-
intent offense if the statute were recast to read "[w]hoever knowingly and willfully resists... an
officer ... in the lawful execution of any legal duty, with the intent of doing violence to the person
of such officer... is guilty of a felony of the third degree." Id. at 920 & n.2 (emphasis added).
72. 396 A.2d 1129, 1133-34 (N.J. 1979) (citation omitted).
73. See supra notes 64, 70-72 and accompanying text; see also California v. Hood, 462 P.2d
370, 377-78 (Cal. 1969) (stating that crimes are "too often" characterized as either specific- or
general-intent based solely upon the presence or absence of words describing a mens rea in the
statutory language of the offense).
620 VANDERBILTLAWREVIEW [Vol. 55:607
required with respect to an element of the crime. 74 Currently, ten
states adhere to the MPC version of the defense.7 5
Despite its improvements upon the specific-intent rule, the
MPC's formulation of the voluntary intoxication defense has also
evoked controversy, primarily with respect to its treatment of
crimes that incorporate a "reckless" mens rea in their definitions. 76
The MPC stipulates that in cases involving voluntary intoxication,
a defendant will be deemed to have acted "recklessly" if he was not
conscious of a risk of which he would have been aware when sober. 7v
Therefore, under the MPC, an intoxicated person who merely be-
haved negligently can be punished for a reckless crime. 7
C. The Involuntary Intoxication Defense
The involuntary intoxication defense is available to a defen-
dant who became inebriated in a nonculpable manner. 79 The exact
meaning of the phrase "nonculpable manner" varies from jurisdic-
74. DRESSLER, supra note 5, at 306. Dressler provides the following example to illustrate
the MPC test:
[A]ssume that under state law "rape" occurs when a male "knowingly has non-
consensual sexual intercourse with a female not his wife." Under this statute, D
would be entitled to acquittal if, because of his self-induced intoxication, he did
not have the knowledge required by the offense, e.g., he did not know that he
was having intercourse, he did not know that the female did not consent, or he
did not know that the victim was a "female not his wife."
Id.
75. See ALA. CODE § 13A-3-2(b) (1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-7 (West 2001); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 501.080(1) (Michie 1999); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. Tit. 17-A, § 37 (West 2001);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 626:4 (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-8 (West 1995); N.Y. PENAL LAW §
15.25 (McKinney 1998); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-04-02 (1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.125 (1990 &
1998 Supp.); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.42(2) (West 2001). For an extensive discussion of one state's
rejection of the specific-intent rule in favor of the MPC formulation, see New Jersey v. Cameron,
514 A.2d 1302, 1303-08 (N.J. 1986).
76. See, e.g., PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY & BLAME 105-06
(1995).
77. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(2) (1962).
78. MPC Commentary contends that awareness of the potential dangers of intoxication is
now so widespread as to justify generally equating "the risks created by the conduct of the
drunken actor and the risks created by his conduct in becoming drunk." MODEL PENAL CODE §
2.08 cmt. (1962). This blanket assumption might be countered by a contrary opinion expressed by
Professor Jerome Hall:
[S]ince drinking alcoholic liquor is not usually followed by gross intoxication
and such intoxication does not usually lead to the commission of serious inju-
ries, it follows that persons who commit them while grossly intoxicated should
not be punished unless, at the time of sobriety and the voluntary drinking, they
had such prior experience as to anticipate their intoxication and that they
would become dangerous in that condition.
HALL, supra note 19, at 556.
79. BASSIOUNI, supra note 8, at 475.
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tion to jurisdiction,80 but typically includes: coerced intoxication,
fraudulently induced intoxication, intoxication from prescription
medicine, and pathological intoxication.8' In states where the invol-
untary intoxication defense has been codified, statutes typically
stipulate that involuntary intoxication is a defense if, as a result of
the involuntary intoxication, the defendant lacked the capacity to
know or appreciate the nature, quality, or wrongfulness of his con-
duct.8 2 Generally, a defendant who was involuntarily inebriated at
the time of an offense will be acquitted of both specific- and general-
intent crimes.8 3
As in the case of voluntary intoxication, 84 the MPC formula-
tion 85 of the involuntary intoxication defense allows a defendant to
produce intoxication evidence to negate the requisite mens rea re-
garding any element of an offense (except in offenses involving
"recklessness").8 6 The MPC also allows an involuntarily inebriated
defendant to invoke his intoxication as an affirmative defense when
it resulted in a condition that would meet the MPC test for insan-
ity.8 7
IV. CHALLENGES TO THE CONTINUED EXISTENCE OF THE
INTOXICATION DEFENSES
Even in jurisdictions where the intoxication defenses are al-
lowed, a wise lawyer might well shy away from employing them.
80. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-3-2(c) cmt. (2000) ("Involuntary intoxication is intoxication
resulting from force, fraud or artifice .... ); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-4(b) (Michie 2000) ("Involun-
tary intoxication means intoxication caused by: (1) consumption of a substance through excus-
able ignorance; or (2) [t]he coercion, fraud, artifice, or contrivance of another person."). Many
jurisdictions leave the definition of involuntary intoxication to be determined through the nega-
tive inferences of the voluntary intoxication definition. See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-202(b)
(Michie 2001) ("Intoxication is self-induced if it is caused by substances which the defendant
knows or ought to know have the tendency to cause intoxication and which he knowingly and
voluntarily introduced or allowed to be introduced into his body unless they were introduced
pursuant to medical advice.").
81. See supra notes 54-57.
82. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 423 (2000); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/6-3 (West
2001); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 562.076(1) (West 2001).
83. See DRESSLER, supra note 5, at 305.
84. See supra Part III.B.
85. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-3-2 (stipulating that "intoxication, whether voluntary or in-
voluntary, is admissible in evidence whenever it is relevant to negate an element of the offense
charged").
86. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(1) (1962).
87. Id. § 2.08(4). The MPC test for insanity is stated as follows: "A person is not responsible
for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks
substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to con-
form his conduct to the requirements of law." MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (1962).
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Perhaps more than any other aspect of the criminal law, the treat-
ment of the intoxicated offender calls into question our own moral
values and forces us to examine our empathy for and aversion to
human frailty. Should we sympathize with the intoxicated offender?
And if we sympathize with him, are we doing so at the expense of
his innocent victim? This moral dilemma highlights merely one of
the challenges to the continued existence of the intoxication de-
fenses.
A. The Intoxication Defenses Do Not Conform with Theories of
Punishment
Legal scholars advance three primary theories to justify the
punishment of criminals: utilitarianism, retributivism, and denun-
ciation.88 The intoxication defenses, as currently formulated and
applied, tend to conflict with all three theories.
1. The Utilitarian Model
Utilitarians believe that laws should be formulated to deter
criminal or antisocial conduct.8 9 Given the statistics currently link-
ing intoxication and criminal behavior, 90 the voluntary intoxication
88. See, e.g., DRESSLER, supra note 5, at 8-14; Ronald J. Rychlak, Society's Moral Right to
Punish: A Further Exploration of the Denunciation Theory of Punishment, 65 TUL. L. REV. 299,
300-01 (1990); see also Morris Raphael Cohen, Moral Aspects of the Criminal Law, in CRIME,
LAW, AND SOCIETY 35, 47-49 (Abraham S. Goldstein & Joseph Goldstein eds., 1971) (discussing
retributivism); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 453,
454-55 (1997) (contrasting the ultilitarian and retributivist views).
89. See Robinson & Darley, supra note 88, at 454-55.
90. A 1998 analysis of the alcohol-crime link reported that "nearly 4 in 10 violent victimiza-
tions involve use of alcohol... and about 4 in 10 offenders... self-report that they were using
alcohol at the time of the offense." See Greenfeld, supra note 40. It should be noted that some
researchers have questioned the traditional "intoxication leads to crime" assumption, observing
that these statistics may be equally indicative of an opposite hypothesis that "crime leads to
intoxication." See Helene Raskin White & D.M. Gorman, Dynamics of the Drug-Crime Relation-
ship, in NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 2000, at 151, 174 (2000), available
at http://www.ojp/usdoj.gov/nij/criminaljustice2000/vol2_2000.html. Raskin White and Gorman
observe that "several aspects of the professional criminal lifestyle are conducive to heavy drink-
ing and drug use, such as working periodically, partying between jobs, being unmarried, and
being geographically mobile." Id. (citations omitted). They further observe that "[i]n addition to
subcultural and lifestyle explanations, it has been proposed that deviant individuals may use
drugs in order to self-medicate or to give themselves an excuse to act in a deviant manner." Id.
(citations omitted). Although interesting, the potential significance of this alternate theory is
somewhat deflated by statistics revealing that two-thirds of victims who were attacked by an
"intimate" (current or former spouse, significant other) reported that alcohol had been a factor in
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defense runs afoul of a utilitarian legal model because it does not
serve to deter excessive drinking or drug use, which may lead to
crime. It has been argued that by reducing criminal liability the
voluntary intoxication defense may, in fact, provide some form of
perverse incentive to a would-be offender. 9 This point has been the
focus of much virulent criticism directed at the voluntary intoxica-
tion doctrine. 92
The involuntary intoxication defense initially appears to be
more cohesive with the principles of utilitarianism. After all, pun-
ishment will not deter antisocial conduct when that conduct is not
the product of the defendant's free will. One could, however, pre-
sent an argument that the involuntary intoxication defense also
appears to encourage antisocial or socially undesirable conduct, in
some cases. Conceivably, a person may have fewer qualms about
coercing or tricking another into taking an intoxicant when he
knows that his victim will not incur liability for any resulting ac-
tions. 93 If an involuntary intoxication defense was entirely unavail-
able to people who suffer ill effects from prescription medication,
physicians might be encouraged to take extra care in explaining to
patients the possible, even if very unusual, side effects of certain
drugs. 94
the crime. Greenfeld, supra note 40. Presumably, these "intimate" crimes were not typically
perpetrated by "career criminals."
91. E.g., Keiter, supra note 2, at 510 ("Far from deterring excessive intoxication, states lim-
iting intoxicated offenders' responsibility effectively subsidize intoxication to the extent they
allow it to exculpate. Limits on their legal responsibility assure inebriates they may consume
dangerous intoxicants, secure in the knowledge that the law will shield them from serious pun-
ishment.").
92. See, e.g., id. But see Hall, supra note 23, at 1048 (dismissing this argument as irra-
tional). Hall states: "Since a person who planned to commit a crime would not wish to incapaci-
tate himself by becoming grossly intoxicated (and that is the degree relevant to the moot issues
of penal responsibility), even less persuasive is the argument that prospective offenders would
actually become intoxicated 'as a shield.' Such professed grounds of decision indicate bias against
inebriate wrongdoers rather than rational support of the rule." Id.
93. See generally Illinois v. Penman, 110 N.E. 894, 900 (Ill. 1915) (concerning defendant
who ingested cocaine tablets after being told that they were breath fresheners). This Note does
not mean to suggest that the actor in this case was influenced by the existence of the involuntary
intoxication defense. The case is merely given as an example of a situation in which awareness of
the defense could be construed to be an underlying factor.
94. See Kelly v. Salt Lake City Civil Serv. Comm'n, 8 P.3d 1048, 1050-51 (Utah Ct. App.
2000) (concerning physician who prescribed sleep aid for defendant and stated that it was not
unusual for patients taking the same dosage as defendant to act in a "bizarre fashion" and con-
sistently warned patients to go straight to bed after taking the drug, but could not specifically
recall telling the defendant to do so).
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2. The Retributivist Model
Retributivism argues that a person should be punished when
he chooses to violate the law, regardless of whether the punishment
will have any future deterrent effect on crime in society. 95 Some-
times characterized as a "just deserts" philosophy, 96 retributivism
also advocates punishment in proportion to the offender's moral
desert for the crime. 97 In principle, the intoxication defenses comply
with this theory of liability. It is not a crime merely to become in-
toxicated. Therefore, when an intoxicated individual commits a
crime, a retributivist would want to assess whether this person was
able to "freely choose" to violate the law in his inebriated condition.
The intoxication defenses, accordingly, allow for consideration of
the defendant's "culpable mental state."98
In practical application, however, the voluntary intoxication
defense often appears to thwart the aims of retributivism rather
than to further them. As previously noted, the specific-intent ver-
sion of the defense places undue emphasis on the wording of crimi-
nal statutes, resulting in illogical and inequitable distinctions be-
tween those defendants who may take advantage of the defense and
those who may not.99 By jettisoning the artificial distinction be-
tween general and specific intent, the MPC formulation of the vol-
untary intoxication defense ostensibly allows for a more just as-
sessment of the defendant's culpability. In practice, however, its
inherent presumption of recklessness can result in equally odd out-
comes, with negligent intoxicated offenders finding that they face
the same liability as purposeful intoxicated offenders. 100
95. Robinson & Darley, supra note 88, at 454-55.
96. Id. at 454.
97. Cohen, supra note 88, at 47-48.
98. See supra Part III.
99. See supra Part III.A.
100. Professors Paul H. Robinson and John M. Darley discuss this phenomenon in the book
Justice, Liability & Blame, observing:
Given this approach by current law [culpable intoxication immediately estab-
lishes a minimum culpability level of recklessness], the primary focus of inquiry
in investigations and trials is on whether the person has the minimum required
culpability as to becoming intoxicated ["negligence" in MPC § 2.08(5)(b)]. A
higher culpability as to becoming intoxicated-recklessly, knowingly, or pur-
posely-does not increase the person's liability. Nor do different levels of a per-
son's pre-intoxication culpability as to committing the offense have a bearing on
his liability. In concrete terms, this means that a person may only be negligent
as to becoming intoxicated but that the law will impute recklessness to him or
her-even recklessness as to causing death....
At the same time, an individual who (for one reason or another) intention-
ally desires to harm another, gets intoxicated, and does so, is given the same li-
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3. The Denunciation Model
The denunciation theory justifies punishment as a means of
declaring society's intolerance for criminal conduct. 101 It is essen-
tially a hybrid of utilitarianism and retributivism, simultaneously
embracing utilitarian goals, such as reinforcing standards for
proper conduct within the community, and retributivist goals, such
as stigmatizing the offender. 10 2 In a denunciation model of criminal
law, the voluntary intoxication defense can be quite problematic.
Like many current beer commercials, which glorify the joys of in-
toxicating wares while surreptitiously tacking on a brief "drink re-
sponsibly" message, jurisdictions that allow the voluntary intoxica-
tion defense may send a mixed message regarding proper societal
conduct. In theory, the voluntary intoxication defense may appear
to endorse inebriation by allowing mitigated liability;10 3 but, in real-
ity, drunken defendants often face judges and juries hostile to the
defense. 10 4 While our society disdains the inebriate to such an ex-
ability treatment as an individual who has no desire to harm another but gets
intoxicated and does so accidentally.
ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 76, at 105.
101. Rychlak, supra note 88, at 331.
102. Id. at 331-32; see also DRESSLER, supra note 5, at 13 (describing denunciation as a hy-
brid of utilitarianism and retributivism).
103. This Note does not mean to suggest that the intoxication defenses are intended to en-
dorse inebriation or that they actually serve to do so; however, this "endorsement" criticism has
been voiced too frequently by opponents of the intoxication defenses for it to be blithely dismissed
by the defense's advocates. State Senator Ray Haynes, who has introduced bills to ban the de-
fense in California, professes in his promotional literature, "[Olur state [by allowing the volun-
tary intoxication defense] says to criminals, 'If you are going to go out and murder somebody, get
drunk or high first, that will help you beat the rap.' "California State Senate Republican Caucus,
End the Voluntary Intoxication Defense, at http:llrepublican.senate.ca.gov/opeds/36/opedl14.asp
(Jan. 22, 1999) (editorial by Sen. Ray Haynes); see also Hall, supra note 23, at 1048 (discussing
the argument that intoxication may be used "as a shield" by offenders if the defense is allowed);
Keiter, supra note 2, at 510 (arguing that the intoxication defenses teach "potential offenders
that antisocial behavior is tolerated when it is committed under the influence of illegal drugs or
alcohol").
104. Although there are no current statistics regarding judge and jury attitudes toward the
voluntary intoxication defense, recent court opinions offer ample evidence of decreased tolerance
for intoxicated offenders in today's "Just Say No" climate. See Chattin v. Florida, 779 So. 2d 415,
415 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (concerning number of prospective jurors who stated that they
could not follow a voluntary intoxication defense instruction if given, and judge neglected to
strike two of these jurors); Wells v. Florida, 776 So.2d 1129 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (concerning
trial judge who committed reversible error by failing to strike jurors who stated that they would
have difficulty applying the voluntary intoxication defense). A defendant's invocation of the vol-
untary intoxicalion defense may ironically result in a harsher sentence from judges and juries
who perceive the defense as an attempt to avoid personal responsibility. In Tennessee v. Wagner,
a truck driver presented evidence of amphetamine intoxication in his defense to charges of reck-
less driving, aggravated assault, and evading arrest. C.C.A. No. 02C01-9809-CC-00264, 1999
Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1344, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 30, 1999). In reviewing his sentence,
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tent that mere public drunkenness can be considered a crime,10 5 the
voluntary intoxication defense perversely seems to reward drunken
behavior by reducing criminal punishment. 10 6 This disjuncture be-
tween societal norms of proper conduct and the sort of conduct "en-
dorsed" by the voluntary intoxication defense creates a significant
legal tension in a denunciation model of criminal punishment.
As with the other two theories of criminal punishment, the
involuntary intoxication defense fares better in a denunciation
model.
B. The Intoxication Defenses Can Be Counterintuitive to a
Layperson
Regardless of whether a criminal defense conforms to legal
philosophers' various theories of punishment, application of the de-
fenses will ultimately be problematic if they do not conform to so-
cial intuitions regarding what the law should be. 0 7 For instance, a
law that offends the sensibilities of the average citizen may be sub-
ject to nullification by a hostile jury.108
In their 1995 book Justice, Liability & Blame, Professors
Paul H. Robinson and John M. Darley reported the results of two
original studies examining community attitudes toward the MPC
versions of the voluntary and involuntary intoxication defenses. 09
Although the community view and the MPC's version were not as
far apart in their basic philosophies as the professors originally hy-
a dissenting appellate court judge noted, "I find the six year sentence is necessary to protect the
public in view of the defendant's refusal to accept responsibility for his use of drugs and driv-
ing .... Id. at *37 (Hayes, J., dissenting); see also Wells, 766 So. 2d at 1130 (concerning pro-
spective juror who stated that she would have trouble applying the defense because she believed
in people "accepting responsibility" for their actions).
105. The crime of public drunkenness often merely involves appearing drunk in public.
PETER MCWILLIAMS, AIN'T NOBODY'S BUSINESS IF You Do: THE ABSURDITY OF CONSENSUAL
CRIMES IN OUR FREE COUNTRY 444 (1996). It often does not involve any other antisocial activi-
ties, such as trespassing or disturbing the peace. Id.; see, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 7.1-5-1-3 (West
2001) (stipulating that "[iut is a Class B misdemeanor for a person to be in a public place or a
place of public resort in a state of intoxication"). Contrary to what one might think, public
drunkenness laws are not collecting dust on some back room shelf of the local police precinct-
apparently they are still vigorously enforced. MCWILLIAMS, supra note 105, at 444. In 1994, more
than six percent of all arrests (or 713,200 total) were for public drunkenness. Id.
106. See supra note 103.
107. See generally VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 151-55 (1986) (dis-
cussing laws that were often nullified by juries because they were "unpopular in the community"
or seen as unduly harsh).
108. See id.
109. ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 76, at 114-15, 146-47.
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pothesized, the "average" 110 citizen's moral intuitions did conflict
with the MPC in a number of significant ways. 1 '
1. The Voluntary Intoxication Study
Robinson and Darley's voluntary intoxication study pre-
sented respondents with various scenarios in which the defendant,
despondent over his roommate's affair with his girlfriend, becomes
intoxicated and subsequently beats an individual to death with a
lead pipe. 1 2 In reviewing the respondents' attitudes toward their
hypothetical voluntarily intoxicated offender, Robinson and Darley
found two primary conflicts between the respondents' views and the
tenets of the MPC. 1" 3 First, the respondents placed great emphasis
on the offender's pre-intoxication culpability in committing the
crime while the MPC places no such importance on this factor. 114
Robinson and Darley noted: "[W]hen a person is purposeful as to
causing death before he becomes intoxicated, the subjects would
impose liability for murder although [the MPC's] voluntary intoxi-
cation provisions impose liability only for manslaughter. That is,
the [MPC], counterintuitively, do[es] not discriminate the case of
the individual who is purposeful about killing another beforehand
110. There is some question regarding the actual "averageness" of the professors' respondent
pool. See Deborah W. Denno, The Perils of Public Opinion, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 741, 745-51
(2000). Professors Robinson and Darley admitted this potential flaw in the studies, stating:
[A] difficulty with our studies is not inherent in the research design but lies in-
stead in the particular procedures we used for selecting our respondents. Put-
ting it inelegantly, we grabbed whomever we could get our hands on. Typically,
the subjects were neighbors, family or friends of the students.
ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 76, at 222. Analyzing census data, Professor Deborah Denno
later concluded that Robinson and Darley's respondents were wealthier, better educated, and
more Republican than the rest of the country. Denno, supra at 751. In addition, minorities ap-
peared to be underrepresented while females were slightly overrepresented. Id. Despite this
limitation, the book is an excellent resource for exploring the layperson's view of the criminal
codes. See id. at 766 (noting that the book is "enormously enlightening on a wide range of top-
ics").
111. ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 76, at 114-15, 146-47.
112. Id. at 107. In some scenarios the defendant killed the duplicitous roommate, in others
he killed a drinking buddy. Id. The scenarios also varied the defendant's mental state prior to
drinking (i.e., D plans to kill roommate prior to becoming intoxicated, D is merely angry with
roommate prior to becoming intoxicated, etc.) and his culpability for his intoxication (i.e., D in-
tended to get drunk, D did not realize that alcohol would mix with medication to produce ex-
treme intoxication, etc.). Id. It should be noted that the violence of the particular scenario em-
ployed by this voluntary intoxication study may have colored the respondents' reactions to the
defense. See Denno, supra note 110, at 755-56 (pointing out that certain scenarios used in the
Robinson and Darley studies were more lurid than others and may have generated more antipa-
thy in the respondents).
113. ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 76, at 115.
114. Id.
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and then gets drunk and kills from the case of the individual who
has no such pre-intoxication purpose.""5
Second, Robinson and Darley noted that the defendant's
level of culpability in becoming intoxicated had a slight effect on the
liability assigned by the respondents, while the MPC does not dif-
ferentiate between levels of culpability in becoming intoxicated once
the threshold of negligence has been established. 116 The professors
observed that "the alteration of liability judgments caused by the
person's level of culpability for getting intoxicated is inconsistent
with the doctrine's treatment of a person's culpability as to becom-
ing intoxicated as a simple 'trigger'-a minimum requirement-
rather than as a liability factor."" 7 In their summary of the volun-
tary intoxication study's results, Robinson and Darley suggested
that this conflict could be resolved by revising the MPC to impose a
slightly higher degree of liability upon defendants who exercise a
greater level of culpability in becoming intoxicated."18
Unfortunately, Robinson and Darley's study provides mini-
mal help in determining whether the MPC's imposition of a reckless
mens rea on a negligently intoxicated offender is amenable to the
general population. 119 The professors noted that "[c]oncerns that
negligence as to becoming intoxicated might be too low a level on
which to impose liability cannot be perfectly tested in this study
since the respondents see the person we tried to portray as negli-
gent 20 as about midway between negligent and reckless."'' 21
2. The Involuntary Intoxication Study
Robinson and Darley's involuntary intoxication study em-
ployed a hypothetical between two brothers who have a history of
antagonism. 122 After an argument, one brother, who has become
involuntarily intoxicated, waits until the other brother has fallen
115. Id. Robinson and Darley note that the codes do notprevent a prosecutor from presenting
this evidence of the pre-intoxication motive to kill-it is simply not a consideration in their for-
mulation of the defense. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 113.
118. Id. at 115.
119. Id. at 114.
120. In Robinson and Darley's negligent intoxication scenario, the defendant is taking medi-
cation for a back condition. Id. at 107. The defendant "never reads the warning label on his
medication and is unaware of any possibility that the medication will react with alcohol to pro-
duce severe intoxication, although the warning label clearly states this." Id.
121. Id. at 114.
122. Id. at 140.
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asleep, douses him with kerosene, and sets him on fire. 123 The in-
voluntary intoxication is caused by an unexpected interaction be-
tween two medications-a painkiller to control long-term pain and
an over-the-counter cold medicine. 124 The physician who prescribed
the painkiller failed to mention any drug interaction side effects,
and the brother did not think to ask.125
Robinson and Darley varied the intoxicated brother's degree
of incapacity from the interaction. 126 In one sense, the results of the
study were predictable: respondents placed a higher liability on the
intoxicated brother in the scenarios where his cognition and control
were the least impaired by the drug interaction. 127 A surprising as-
pect of the study revealed that, in all but one scenario, 128 a majority
of the respondents imposed some punishment on the involuntarily
intoxicated brother. 129 This result conflicts with the general com-
mon law rule that involuntary intoxication entitles a defendant to
acquittal in specific- and general-intent crimes.1 30
C. The Intoxication Defenses Are Difficult to Apply
The need to establish a mens rea (a "guilty mind") in crimi-
nal prosecutions is a basic principle of law131 that becomes incredi-
bly murky when dealing with the intoxicated defendant. The con-
cept of general- and specific-intent crimes originated due to the dif-
ficulty of establishing the exact criminal intentions of an inebriated
123. Id. As with Robinson and Darley's voluntary intoxication scenario, see supra Part
VIB.1, the exceptionally violent nature of the crime presented in this scenario may have made
the hypothetical defendant particularly unsympathetic to respondents and colored their re-
sponses to the involuntary intoxication defense in general. See Denno, supra note 110, at 755-56.
124. ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 76, at 140. Robinson and Darley noted that they in-
cluded the over-the-counter cold medicine in the scenario in order to create the perception of a
relatively safe drug that a person could reasonably expect not to interact with the painkiller. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 141.
128. In the scenario in which the intoxicated brother had a "high cognitive dysfunction" (an
unawareness of the meaning or the wrongfulness of the harmful actions), fifty-two percent of the
respondents concluded that he should not punished and/or liable for his actions. Id. at 141
tbl.5.5. Robinson and Darley noted that, interestingly, respondents read a high cognitive dys-
function as implicitly incorporating a high level of control dysfunction as well. Id. at 143-44. The
professors observed, "Intuitively, a person who is thinking so oddly as to be unaware of the
wrongfulness of killing somebody may be seen by respondents as not able to stop the action be-
cause he or she sees no moral need to stop it." Id. at 144.
129. As previously observed, the particularly gruesome nature of the control scenario-fiery
fratricide-may have contributed to the respondents' desire to impose some form of liability on
the involuntarily intoxicated brother. See supra notes 112, 123.
130. DRESSLER, supra note 5, at 304-05.
131. KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 7, at 217.
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offender. 132 Unfortunately, this judicial band-aid merely serves to
exacerbate the problem by attempting to impose an artificial con-
struct, unsupported by scientific evidence, 13 3 on the eternal conun-
drum presented by the intoxicated actor: "What was he thinking?"
In a criminal prosecution, the attempt to determine whether
an intoxicated defendant acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly, or
with sufficient malice often threatens to turn judge and jury into
amateur psychologists and philosophers. Consider a case where the
voluntarily intoxicated defendant hallucinates and, in this state,
injures a person whom he mistakenly believes will harm him. 13 The
defendant has acted intentionally within the context of his halluci-
nation; however, since he would never have committed the crime
but for his delusion, can the defendant really be held to have com-
mitted an intentional offense?3 5
Next, consider a case in which the defendant committed a
murder to which there are no witnesses. The defendant claims to
remember nothing of the crime and the medical examiner testifies
that, at the time of the murder, the defendant would, in fact, have
had a very high blood alcohol content (in the range of 0.26 to
0.30).136 Under these circumstances, can one conclude beyond a rea-
sonable doubt whether the defendant acted purposely, knowingly,
or recklessly? 37
132. Layton, supra note 4, at 553.
133. Carter, supra note 13, at 413 (noting that "[t]here is no scientific evidence presented to
confirm the intuitive assumption that alcohol obliterates specific intent thoughts, but not general
intent thoughts," and reporting that "Professor [Jerome] Hall, in 1948, noted that the intention
to perform a bodily movement is usually inseparable from the reason why the movement is per-
formed"); see also supra note 64 (noting that the terms "specific intent" and "general intent" have
never been sufficiently defined).
134. See Iowa v. Hall, 214 N.W.2d 205, 206 (Iowa 1974) (concerning a defendant who, high on
LSD and hallucinating, killed a person whom he believed was a rabid dog); Tennessee v. Wagner,
C.C.A. No. 02C01-9809-CC-00264, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1344, at *2-10 (Tenn. Crim.
App. Dec. 30, 1999) (concerning a defendant afflicted with amphetamine-induced psychosis, who
ran a number of cars off the road believing that they contained snipers who were out to get him).
Both cases are discussed in greater detail infra Part V.C.
135. Judging by the verdicts in Iowa v. Hall and Tennessee v. Wagner, the answer to this
question appears to be "yes." See infra Part V.C.
136. See Minnesota v. Crowsbreast, No. C3-00-14, 2000 WL 1664730, at *1 (Minn. App. Nov.
7, 2000).
137. In the Crowsbreast case, a jury found the defendant guilty of second-degree intentional
murder, second-degree felony-murder, and first-degree assault. Id. at *1. The Minnesota Court of
Appeals affirmed: "By finding Crowsbreast guilty of second-degree intentional murder, the jury
implicitly rejected his voluntary intoxication defense. Although the evidence indicates that
Crowbreast's blood alcohol content was quite high, between 0.26 and 0.30, at the time of the
murder, the supreme court has affirmed a jury's finding of intentional homicide by defendants
with comparably high blood-alcohol levels." Id. at *3. For an estimate of the physical effects of a
0.26 or 0.30 BAC, see supra note 6.
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An understandable discomfort in attempting to solve such
riddles may be largely responsible for the current move away from
the intoxication defenses. 138
V. THE INTOXICATION DEFENSES ARE ESSENTIALLY
UNAVAILABLE AS CURRENTLY CONSTRUED
While the criminal code books in a majority of American ju-
risdictions still retain some formulation of the intoxication de-
fenses, judges and juries appear increasingly inclined to interpret
the defenses in a manner that ultimately provides little or no de-
fense at all. For example, one response to the problem of determin-
ing an intoxicated actor's exact state of mind has been to construe
the intoxication defenses in such a way that only an entirely inca-
pacitated actor could effectively contend that he did not act with
the necessary mens rea. 139 The following cases serve to illustrate
further various ways in which restrictive or questionable legal in-
terpretations serve to abridge the use of the intoxication defenses.
A. Intoxication Must Render the Defendant Unconscious
In some cases, judges and juries have found that the defen-
dant's mere ability to remain conscious demonstrates enough
awareness to negate the intoxication defenses. 140 In Kansas v.
Walker, the Supreme Court of Kansas directly addressed this is-
sue.' 4 ' The defendant in Walker complained that the trial court's
jury instruction regarding voluntary intoxication presented a verbal
Catch-22 by stating that intoxication must have rendered the de-
fendant "utterly devoid of consciousness or awareness" in order to
be considered as a defense. 142 The defendant contended that this
instruction would make the voluntary intoxication defense avail-
able only where the defendant was comatose at the time of the of-
138. See generally Miller, supra note 28, at 757-58 (observing that "[g]iven the lack of scien-
tific evidence concerning how alcohol affects intent, it is not surprising that both the Montana
and the MPC approach seem tentative in recognizing the intoxication defense").
139. See Hall, supra note 23, at 1050. Hall noted that, even when jurisdictions pay "lip ser-
vice" to the intoxication defenses, the practical usefulness of these exculpatory doctrines can be
greatly abridged "by the insistence that 'the intoxication must be ... of that degree and extent as
renders the defendant practically an automaton.' " Id. (quoting language from Tate v. Kentucky,
80 S.W.2d 817, 821 (Ky. 1935)).
140. See, e.g., Kansas v. Walker, 845 P.2d 1, 15-16 (Kan. 1993).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 15.
2002]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
fense. 143 The Walker court admitted that this interpretation ren-
dered the voluntary intoxication defense a nullity since "being both
comatose and capable of doing any act is impossible." 144 The court
held that they would "disapprove of' further usage of the contested
phrase, but that its use did not warrant reversal in this case. 145
While generally not going so far as to state that the defen-
dant's intoxication must render him "utterly devoid of conscious-
ness," courts and juries sometimes appear surreptitiously to apply
this standard. In a recent case, Tenneseee v. Crim, the court found
the defendant to be guilty of "knowingly"'146 possessing more than
0.5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell within one thousand feet
of a school and "knowingly" possessing less than 0.5 ounces of mari-
juana.'47 On appeal, the defendant argued that he had been too in-
toxicated to "be aware of the nature of his conduct."'148 At trial, the
arresting officer had testified that the defendant was "drunk as a
Lord"'149 at the time of the apprehension, noting that he had been
unable to perform a field sobriety test due to the defendant's ex-
treme inebriation. 150 Despite the arresting officer's own admission
that the defendant was very intoxicated, the trial judge concluded
that defendant was capable of knowing that he possessed less than
0.5 ounces of marijuana, knowing that he possessed more than 0.5
grams of cocaine, knowing that he was within one thousand feet of
a school, and knowingly intending to sell the cocaine.1"' The Ten-
nessee Criminal Court of Appeals upheld the defendant's convic-
tions, noting that the defendant was "able to get out of his vehicle,
open the back door and retrieve identification from his jacket
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 15-16.
146. Under the applicable statute in this case, a person "acts knowingly with respect to con-
duct or to circumstances surrounding the conduct when the person is aware of the nature of the
conduct or that the circumstances exist." TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-302(b) (West 2000) (emphasis
added).
147. No. 01C019803CC00101, 2000 WL 255325, at *1-2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 18, 2000).
The defendant was also found guilty of possession of a firearm on school grounds. Id. at *1. He
was sentenced to serve fifteen years for the cocaine conviction. Id. Sentences for the other two
offenses were suspended. Id.
148. Id. at *2.
149. The officer recalled that the defendant had slurred speech, bloodshot eyes, and difficulty
standing, sitting, locating his identification, and using his car keys. Id. at *1.
150. Id.
151. Id. at *2. The trial judge acknowledged that the defendant was "clearly intoxicated," but
concluded that he was still capable of "knowing" conduct. Id. It is unclear from the court's opin-
ion in Crirn what evidence was presented to indicate that the defendant intended to sell the
cocaine. At the time of his arrest, he was alone in his car. Id. at *1.
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pocket."1 52 The court's superficial analysis of the defendant's mental
state appears to equate the mere ability to perform basic physical
movements, such as opening a car door, with "knowing" mens rea
for each of the charged offenses.1"3
B. The Defendant's Subsequent Recollection of a Crime
Demonstrates Intent
Another problematic, but apparently popular, method that
judges and juries have employed to curtail application of the intoxi-
cation defenses has been the use of an intoxicated defendant's sub-
sequent recollection of the offense to infer his criminal intent at the
time of the offense.154
In Minnesota v. Thunberg, the defendant was convicted of
second-degree felony murder for stabbing his girlfriend to death. 155
The victim, Katherine Jones, had recently broken up with the de-
fendant, but still lived with him at the time of her slaying.156 Wit-
nesses to the crime testified that the defendant, who had spent the
week "crying and drinking," had walked into the kitchen, mum-
bling, and emerged with a knife. 157 Suddenly, he lunged at Jones,
stabbing her four times. 158 Following his arrest, defendant had a
blood alcohol content of 0.24.159
On appeal, the defendant contended that his level of intoxi-
cation prevented him from forming the requisite intent for second-
degree felony murder. 160 The Supreme Court of Minnesota affirmed
152. Id. at *2.
153. In contrast, the Indiana courts have developed a reasonable guideline for determining
an intoxicated offender's ability to form the requisite mens rea. See Wright v. Indiana, 730
N.E.2d 713, 718 (Ind. 2000). The courts have held that evidence showing the defendant's ability
to "devise a plan, operate equipment, instruct the behavior of others, or carry out acts requiring
physical skill" may be used as proof of his ability to form the requisite mens rea. Id. These speci-
fied acts, as opposed to basic motor functions such as getting in and out of a vehicle, do seem to
require a level of practical thought and physical dexterity that would not be displayed by an
extremely intoxicated actor.
154. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Thunberg, 492 N.W.2d 534, 539 (Minn. 1992) (finding that the
defendant's later confession that he had killed the victim provided sufficient evidence that he
possessed the requisite intent for second-degree felony murder).




159. Id. at 536. The defendant's toxicology expert testified that, at the time of the offense, his
blood alcohol content could have been between 0.26 and 0.28. Id. For an estimate of the physical
effects of this BAC level, see supra note 6.
160. Thunberg, 492 N.W.2d at 539. Under Minnesota law, a defendant is "guilty of second-
degree felony murder if he 'causes the death of a human being, without intent to effect the death
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defendant's conviction, stating that a BAC of 0.24 "does not compel
the conclusion that he could not form specific intent."161 Although
blackouts are common at a BAC of 0.20,162 the court expressed
skepticism regarding the sincerity of defendant's claimed lack of
recollection of the stabbing itself, characterizing his blackout as
"selective."'163 The court noted that, while the defendant claimed he
could not remember the stabbing, he did recall holding a red-
handled knife and remembered some events immediately following
the attack. 164 Shortly after the stabbing, the defendant also had
confessed to the crime to a number of people, including upstairs
neighbors, the police, and the hospital doctor. 165 The court con-
cluded that this evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendant's
conviction, but failed to explain how the defendant's later recollec-
tion of various incidents demonstrated that he was capable of hav-
ing the specific intent to commit a felony offense at the time of the
crime. 166
A similar line of reasoning was employed by a court in Kan-
sas v. Hayes, in which the defendant had been convicted of inten-
tional second-degree murder in the stabbing death of a fellow par-
tygoer. 167 The defendant and his brothers had become involved in
an altercation with the victim following a birthday party, during
which time the defendant pulled a knife and stabbed the victim
multiple times. 68 After the fight, the defendant went to his aunt's
house where he tearfully admitted to stabbing someone. 169
On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred by
refusing to instruct the jury on voluntary intoxication. 170 Although
the defendant testified that he drank "some beer and a pint of
whiskey" on the evening of the party, the Kansas Supreme Court
concluded that the lower court's refusal was merited because there
was no evidence indicating that the defendant's faculties were
of any person, while committing or attempting to commit a felony offense ....... Id. (quoting
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.19(2) (West 1987)).
161. Id.
162. See supra note 6.
163. Thunberg, 492 N.W.2d at 53.
164. Id.
165. Id. In using this post-crime confession as evidence of the defendant's recollection of the
actual event, the court apparently ignored the defendant's testimony stating that he did recall,
after the attack, his friend telling him that he had stabbed Jones. Id. at 535.
166. Id. at 539.
167. 17 P.3d 317, 318 (Kan. 2001).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 322.
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greatly impaired. 171 Specifically, the court noted that the defen-
dant's confession to his aunt suggested that he was "aware of his
involvement" in the crime. 172
These holdings, which indicate that "intention" can be in-
ferred merely from later "awareness" of the crime and of the defen-
dant's involvement in it, seem to restrict the use of the voluntary
intoxication defense to instances in which the defendant experi-
ences a total blackout from the time of the incident up until the
time of apprehension.
C. Delusionary Intentions Are Still Intentions; Drug-Induced
Psychosis Is Voluntary Intoxication
Occasionally, cases arise in which the defendant, suffering
from a drug-induced hallucination, commits an offense while believ-
ing that he is acting in self-defense. 173 These cases raise the ques-
tion of whether an intention that takes place within the context of
an intoxication-induced delusion qualifies as an "intentional" mens
rea for the purposes of determining criminal responsibility. This
seems like a potentially provocative question. The courts have re-
soundingly answered "yes" to this question, however, showing little
interest in addressing the psychological subtleties involved in these
cases. 174 This lack of analysis may be partly explained by the infre-
quency with which these "delusionary intention" cases arise and the
fact that they are often framed as insanity or involuntary intoxica-
tion issues on appeal. 75
The case of William Curtis Wagner highlights problems in-
herent in the application of the intoxication defenses to cases in-
volving drug-induced hallucinations. 176 Wagner, a truck driver for
nearly eight years, was heading home from a long haul when he
stopped at a convenience store to buy a soda and a headache rem-
edy. 77 As he returned to his truck, an unidentified man approached
Wagner and offered to give him something to "keep [him] awake,"
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See Iowa v. Hall, 214 N.W.2d 205, 206 (Iowa 1974); Tennessee v. Wagner, C.C.A. No.
02C01-9809-CC-00264, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1344, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 30,
1999).
174. See Wagner, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1344, at *15-16; Hall, 214 N.W.2d at 210-11.
175. Wagner, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1344, at *12-16; Hall, 214 N.W.2d at 213-14
(LeGrand, Mason, and Rawlings, JJ., dissenting).
176. Wagner, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1344, at *1.
177. Id. at *3.
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which the man called "crank."178 Interpreting this to mean that the
substance was some form of caffeine, Wagner allowed the man to
put some in his drink. 179 Wagner recalled getting back into his
truck and driving for a while. 180 The next thing that Wagner claims
to remember is waking up in jail. 181
During this "blackout" period, while in a state of ampheta-
mine-induced intoxication, 82 Wagner led police on an extended
chase up a Tennessee highway. 183 During this pursuit, Wagner's
truck damaged a number of cars and caused serious injury to the
occupants of one vehicle. 8 4 The chase ended when Wagner eventu-
ally pulled over at a rest stop and exited his vehicle. 8 5 He report-
edly responded to the sight of the armed officers surrounding his
vehicle by asking, "What did I do? What's going on?"'1 6 On the way
to the emergency room, Wagner told the police that there were "sni-
pers [who were] going to shoot him..., snipers behind signs...
[and] snipers in other cars . ... "187
The jury rejected Wagner's voluntary and involuntary intoxi-
cation defenses, finding him guilty of eight counts of aggravated
assault, three counts of vandalism, three counts of leaving the
scene of an accident, and a number of other miscellaneous charges
178. Id. at *4. "Crank" is a slang term for methamphetamine, a stimulant that produces
wakefulness, euphoria, and an improved ability to concentrate on simple tasks when adminis-
tered in therapeutic doses. See Edward Henry Benton et al., Note, Drugs and Criminal Respon-
sibility, 33 VAND. L. REV. 1145, 1169-70 (1980). Methamphetamine is also known as "speed" or
"crystal meth." Id. at 1169 n.268.
179. Wagner, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1344, at *4. A psychiatrist, testifying for the de-
fense, stated that he had heard the word "crank" used "to describe any and all stimulant sub-
stances, anywhere from caffeine all the way to and including amphetamine-similar substances."
Id. at *12. He further testified that in a "clinical setting" the word crank is "generally used by
non-addictive individuals to refer to non-amphetamine stimulants." Id. For the prosecution, a
truck driver who witnessed the chase testified that "crank" is an "illegal substance that most
[truck] drivers know about." Id.
180. Id. at *10.
181. Id.
182. Acute amphetamine intoxication is characterized by restlessness, anxiety, and delirium.
See Special Project, supra note 177, at 1170. This may progress to a pattern of psychosis that is
clinically indistinguishable from paranoid schizophrenia and includes paranoid delusions as well
as visual and auditory hallucinations. Id. Wagner apparently had an aberrant reaction to the
drug since his toxicology reports following the incident showed a "therapeutic," not "toxic," level
of the methamphetamine. Wagner, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1344, at *10. This fact lends
credence to his claim that he was inexperienced with crank. Id. at *10-11.
183. Wagner, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1344, at *5-9.
184. Id. at *5-8.
185. Id. at *8.
186. Id.
187. Id. at *9.
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including violation of the seat belt law.188 On appeal, Wagner con-
tended that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that he was not involuntarily intoxicated. 189 The Tennessee Court of
Criminal Appeals affirmed Wagner's convictions, noting that the
jury had obviously rejected Wagner's claim that the unidentified
man at the truck stop had tricked him into taking methampheta-
mine. 190
Although Wagner's "fraudulent" intoxication story seems
questionable, the resolution of his case is troubling. Whether or not
Wagner was previously familiar with crank, the evidence tended to
show that he experienced an extremely aberrant effect from the
drug that day.' 9 ' Having taken the methamphetamine to increase
his alertness, Wagner had no reason to anticipate-and certainly no
reason to desire-the hallucinatory mental state that ensued. No
evidence was introduced to indicate a motive for Wagner's bizarre
behavior. 192 He had no previous history of violence. 193 While a con-
viction for "reckless" crimes would be understandable in such a
case, the court appeared to equate an intention to take a drug with
an -intention consequently to perform any number of deranged
acts. 194 The court's superficial analysis ignores the real issue of
whether Wagner intended to run innocent people off the road and
knew that he was doing this.
Another problem presented by these cases concerns the defi-
nitions of "involuntary" versus "voluntary" intoxication. Where the
defendant, as in the Wagner case, voluntarily ingests a substance,
but suffers an unanticipated, "involuntary" reaction, does this alter
the voluntary nature of his intoxication? In a 1974 case, Iowa v.
188. Id. at *1-2. The court sentenced Wagner to six years of incarceration. Id. at *2.
189. Id. at *12.
190. Id. at *15-16, 33.
191. Wagner's blood test showed a therapeutic level of the drug in his system, yet his behav-
ior indicated acute intoxication. Id. at *10; see also Benton et al., supra note 178, at 1170 (noting
that acute amphetamine intoxication is "characterized by... confusion, talkativeness, anxi-
ety[,] ... and delirium").
192. See Wagner, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1344, at *8-11.
193. Wagner had previously been charged with unlawful possession of a weapon and had
been sentenced to one year of probation. Id. at *27.
194. In upholding the trial court's denial of alternative sentencing measures, the court of ap-
peals approvingly quoted the following statement by the trial judge:
"I say this, Mr. Wagner, I'm sorry for you, but what you did and the excuse you
give, the Court felt that what you did was deliberate and that you had to have
known that [the drug you took] would affect you .... That in and of itself,
without anybody being injured, is a very serious matter, and the Court feels the
jury was quite lenient on you ... "
Id. at *27-28.
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Hall, the Supreme Court of Iowa wrestled with this question. 195 The
defendant, a hitchhiker accused of shooting a man who had given
him a ride, testified that acquaintances in California had given him
a pill that was supposed to make him feel "groovy." 196 The defen-
dant took the pill while driving the victim's car and soon began hal-
lucinating. 197 He claimed that at the time of the shooting he be-
lieved the victim to be a rabid dog. 198 At trial, two doctors hypothe-
sized that the defendant had ingested LSD. 199 Rejecting the defen-
dant's insanity and intoxication defenses, a jury found him guilty of
first-degree murder. 200
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Iowa was divided regarding
the appropriate treatment of drug-induced hallucinations. 20 1 The
majority rejected the defendant's involuntary intoxication argu-
ment, noting that he was not tricked or forced into taking the pill. 20 2
The dissent disagreed with the majority's interpretation of "volun-
tary" intoxication, arguing:
The testimony shows defendant took a pill which he knew to be a drug but which
he did not know to be LSD and which he testified he thought to be harmless, al-
though he had been told it would make him feel groovy. There is nothing to indi-
cate he knew it could induce hallucinations or lead to the frightening debilitating
effects of mind and body to which the doctors testified. The majority nevertheless
holds the defendant's resulting drug intoxication was voluntary. I disagree.
Surely, a court which has so zealously guarded unwary defendants from "volun-
tary" guilty pleas made without full realization of the consequences and which has
rejected any attempted waiver of constitutional rights unless knowingly and intel-
ligently made-surely that same court will not now say this defendant voluntarily
drugged himself because he willingly swallowed a pill without knowledge of its na-
ture and while ignorant of its potentially harmful effects.
In other words, does voluntary in this context refer to the mechanical act of in-
gesting the pill or does it refer to a willing and intelligent assumption of the possi-
ble harmful consequences of that act?
20 3
Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Iowa ruled to affirm the defen-
dant's sentence. 204




199. Id. at 207.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 205, 211 (en banc) (6-3 decision).
202. The Iowa courts did not allow alcohol-induced temporary insanity ('pathological intoxi-
cation") as a complete defense when intoxication was voluntary, and the majority concluded that
this rule should be extended to voluntary drug intoxication. See id. at 207-08.
203. Id. at 214 (LeGrand, Mason, and Rawlings, JJ., dissenting) (citations omitted).
204. Id. at 211.
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In light of the paucity of evidence supporting the defendant's
theory of the case, 205 the outcome of Hall appears justified, but the
Hall dissent clearly had hoped to raise policy concerns regarding
interpretation of the intoxication defenses that reached beyond the
fact pattern at issue. 20 6 Justice Cardozo once observed that "[t]he
dissenter speaks to the future."20 7 Unfortunately, as demonstrated
by the court's analysis in Tennessee v. Wagner, the question posed
by the Hall dissent has yet to receive thoughtful judicial examina-
tion.208
VI. A PROPOSED REVISION
As shown by the preceding discussion, the hydraheaded di-
lemma presented in assessing criminal liability for intoxicated ac-
tors will not be easily conquered. No proposed revision will either
correct all of the perceived problems or satisfy all of the parties to
the legal debate. With that caveat, this Note offers the following
suggestions for revision of the intoxication defenses.
A. Where There Is Sufficient Evidence of Intoxication, Establish a
Baseline Mens Rea of "Recklessness"
The first step in attaining a more coherent, useful intoxica-
tion defense should be the abandonment of dubious analysis of ine-
briated offenders' "intentions" at the time of the crime. 20 9 In a 1944
205. The defendant was the only surviving witness of these events; no other witnesses cor-
roborated his story. Id. at 206-07. The State presented evidence indicating that the defendant
took $208 from the victim's wallet following the shooting, which supported a robbery motive for
the crime. See id. at 206.
206. Id. at 214 (LeGrand, Mason, and Rawlings, JJ., dissenting).
207. BENJAMIN N. CARDozo, LAw AND LITERATURE AND OTHER ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES 36
(1931).
208. See Tennessee v. Wagner, C.C.A. No. 02C01-9809-CC-00264, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App.
LEXIS 1344, at *12-17 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 30, 1999).
209. Recognizing the difficulty in determining an intoxicated offender's intent, some com-
mentators have suggested the adoption of a "drunk and dangerous" statute similar to the one
used in Germany. See, e.g., Layton, supra note 4, at 563; Miller, supra note 28, at 758-60. The
German statute states:
Whoever intentionally or negligently becomes intoxicated through the use of al-
cohol or other intoxicating substances is punishable up to five years in prison, if
while in that intoxicated condition he commits a criminal act and if by virtue of
the intoxication is not responsible for a criminal act (or his non-responsibility is
a possibility).
Miller, supra note 28, at 758. While the drunk and dangerous statute does have the advantage of
eliminating the problematic intent analysis, even an advocate of the statute acknowledges that it
has the potential to result in overly lenient sentences, observing:
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article, Professor Jerome Hall pointed out that examination of the
inebriated defendant's intent, or lack of intent, has imbued the vol-
untary intoxication defense with a logical fallacy. 21° Professor Hall
very perceptively noted that decisions of the courts, which generally
restrict the intoxication defenses to crimes in which the defendant
lacks intention, rather than control over his conduct, ignores the
very nature of most intoxicated offenders' actions.21' Hall observed
that offenses committed by intoxicated actors usually do not reveal
"wild, disorganized, aimless" conduct, but rather conduct aimed at
attaining specific goals. 212 He concluded that "confusion is inescap-
able in the prevailing attempted implementation of a mitigating
doctrine stated in terms of 'intention' where lack of intention is not
an essential differentia as a matter of fact."21 3 An inebriated actor
may not lack the capacity to intend an act, but may be unable to
understand the wrongful nature or consequences of the act. There-
fore, he is unable to restrain his antisocial intention. Accordingly,
Hall proposed that the intoxication defenses should be expressed in
terms of "lack of understanding of the ethical quality of the act and
of ability to control," rather than in terms of lack of intent.214
In the years following Hall's article, the American Law Insti-
tute developed the MPC version of the intoxication defenses, 21 5
which improved upon the specific-intent formulation of the volun-
tary intoxication defense by eliminating consideration of arbitrary
distinctions between specific- and general-intent crimes in deter-
mining the availability of the defense. 21 6 Unfortunately, the MPC
formulation exacerbated the problem identified by Hall by focusing
its analysis upon whether the defendant lacked the state of mind
required with respect to any element of the crime. 217 Thus, the MPC
rules merely served to expand the problematic "intention" inquiry.
[U]nder the drunk and dangerous approach, if a defendant were charged with
first degree murder and effectively negated intent with an intoxication defense,
that defendant would receive a maximum of five years incarceration. Five years
is an offensively lenient approach for someone who took a human life, regard-
less of [his] intent.
Id. at 760. Therefore, this Note proposes an alternative statutory revision.
210. Hall, supra note 23, at 1053-54.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 1054.
214. Id. at 1083.
215. See DRESSLER, supra note 5, at 22-23 (describing the genesis of the MPC project).
216. Id. at 306.
217. Id.
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This Note proposes the following formulation of the intoxica-
tion defense, designed to eliminate "intention" analysis: Intoxica-
tion is not a defense to prosecution for an offense; but, where the
defendant introduces sufficient evidence of extreme intoxication, a
reckless mens rea will be presumed in assessing liability.
The proposed "presumption of recklessness" allows judges
and juries to focus on fact-based inquiries regarding the credibility
of the defendant's intoxication evidence and the physical manifesta-
tions of his impairment, rather than requiring these factfinders to
delve into murky psychoanalysis of the intoxicated offender's men-
tal processes. Establishing a "reckless" mens rea generally requires
proof that the offender disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable
risk of which he was aware. 218 Holding inebriated offenders liable
for "reckless" crimes under the proposed rule is warranted because
of their culpability in becoming grossly intoxicated. 219 Although one
may argue that extreme intoxication does not necessarily lead to
risky behavior, the drafters of the MPC have convincingly con-
tended that widespread awareness of the potential consequences of
excessive drinking should allow the law to impute recklessness to
an intoxicated offender. 220
A few terms in the proposed rule have been left deliberately
vague. First, the phrase "sufficient evidence" is meant to accommo-
date two possible standards of proof, depending on the policy choice
of the jurisdiction. A jurisdiction could treat the proposed rule as a
standard "failure of proof' defense, 221 such as "mistake-of-fact," 222 in
which case the defendant would merely have the burden of produc-
ing the intoxication evidence. 223 Once this has been satisfied, the
prosecution would be required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant was not too intoxicated to control his actions and
to appreciate the import of his conduct. On the other hand, a juris-
diction might choose to treat the proposed intoxication defense as
an "excuse," similar to insanity, in which case the defendant should
be required to establish his extreme intoxication by a preponder-
ance of the evidence. 224
218. See ROBINSON, supra note 2, § 61(a)(1)(A), at 213. Under the proposed "presumption of
recklessness," this showing would not be required. Evidence of extreme intoxication would trig-
ger a finding of recklessness.
219. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
220. Id. (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 (1962)).
221. DRESSLER, supra note 5, at 498.
222. Id. at 135.
223. See ROBINSON, supra note 2, § 65(a)(2), at 293.
224. Id. § 176(a), at 339-40. In either case, evidence showing that the defendant was able to
devise a plan, operate equipment, instruct the behavior of others, or carry out acts requiring
2002]
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Second, the phrase "extreme intoxication" is left deliberately
open-ended because the effects of various intoxicants on different
individuals cannot be precisely calculated or comprehensively de-
fined.225 For instance, if one were to add language such as "extreme
intoxication which renders the defendant unable to control or appre-
ciate the import of his actions," this phrase would continue to create
problems in cases where the defendant experiences drug-induced
hallucinations. In a case such as Tennessee v. Wagner, the defen-
dant, while clearly suffering from the extreme effects of an intoxi-
cant, could still be said to be able to control and understand his ac-
tions within the context of his hallucination. 226 This "control" lan-
guage also invites the trier of fact to ponder unfathomables such as:
"Did defendant James Egelhoff exhibit control when he kicked the
camera out of the hands of the detective-or did he exhibit a lack of
control?"227
The intoxication defenses should not be drafted in a way that
encourages judges and juries to overintellectualize an essentially
empirical inquiry. Most people have encountered or experienced
intoxication; even extreme intoxication, and are able to identify the
phenomenon. The officer in Tennessee v. Crim recognized that the
defendant was "drunk as a Lord."228 Officers in Tennessee v. Wagner
testified to the defendant's bizarre, delusional behavior. 229 It was
recognized that these defendants were extremely intoxicated. It
would be justifiable to treat them as reckless in such a condition.
The courts should not attempt a further inquiry into the workings
of these defendants' debilitated thought processes.
physical skill around the time of the offense would be likely to effectively rebut the defendant's
claimed extreme intoxication. See supra note 152 and accompanying text (citing Wright v. Indi-
ana, 730 N.E.2d 713, 718 (Ind. 2000)).
225. William Wagner experienced dangerous hallucinations with only a "therapeutic" level of
amphetamine in his system. See Tennessee v. Wagner, C.C.A. No. 02C01-9809-CC-00264, 1999
Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1344, at *10 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 30, 1999). James Egelhoff was able
to hit ambulance attendants and kick a camera from the hands of a detective while he had a
BAC of 0.36 (the level of surgical anesthesia). See Miller, supra note 28, at 757-58.
226. See supra Part V.C.
227. See Miller, supra note 28, at 757-58.
228. No. 01C019803CC00101, 2000 WL 255325, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 18, 2000).
229. 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1344, at *8-9.
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B. Where Extreme Intoxication Has Been Established, Allow the
Defendant's Pre-intoxication Culpability to Rebut the Presumption
of Recklessness
In Robinson and Darley's voluntary intoxication study, the
respondents placed great emphasis on the offender's pre-
intoxication culpability in committing the crime when assessing
liability; but, the intoxication defenses currently place no impor-
tance on this factor. 230 Under the proposed rule, in a case where the
defendant has established extreme intoxication, the prosecution
would be able to introduce evidence of the defendant's pre-
intoxication culpability in order to rebut the presumption of reck-
lessness.
For example, in Tennessee v. Crim, the defendant could
probably establish his extreme intoxication through the testimony
of the arresting officer. 231 Employing the proposed rule, the court
would then presume that the defendant was able to act recklessly,
but not knowingly or purposely. Therefore, under this presumption
of recklessness, the defendant could not be convicted of knowingly
possessing less than 0.5 grams of cocaine with intent to sell.232 The
prosecution could rebut the recklessness presumption, however, by
introducing evidence showing that, at some time prior to his intoxi-
cation, the defendant discussed his intent to sell the cocaine at the
school. Therefore, the defendant would be found guilty of the know-
ing crime regardless of his extreme intoxication at the time of the
offense.
This rebuttal of recklessness is justified because the defen-
dant's subsequent intoxication obviously does not invalidate his
previous intention to commit the offense. In addition, a codified
consideration of the defendant's pre-intoxication culpability effec-
tively invalidates the argument that the intoxication defenses "en-
courage" offenders to get drunk prior to committing their intended
offenses by reducing liability.233 This addendum to the proposed
rule would also bring the intoxication defense's considerations
closer to those envisioned by the layperson, as documented by Rob-
inson and Darley's study. 234
230. ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 76, at 115; see also supra notes 114-15 and accompany-
ing text.
231. 2000 WL 255325, at *1.
232. See id.
233. See supra note 103 and accompanying text (detailing "endorsement" criticism of volun-
tary intoxication defense).
234. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text (explaining Robinson and Darley study).
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C. Where Extreme Intoxication Has Been Established, Allow
Consideration of the Defendant's Negligent or Involuntary
Intoxication as a Mitigating Factor
It has long been contended that the involuntary intoxication
defense is illusory. 235 Like the Loch Ness monster, it is often dis-
cussed, sometimes searched for, but ultimately never convincingly
documented. 2 6 The defense's infrequent application may be partly
due to a generally felt reluctance to exonerate completely the invol-
untarily intoxicated actor.237 In light of Robinson and Darley's find-
ings, indicating that generally a majority of people believe that an
involuntarily intoxicated offender should incur some liability for his
crime, 238 this Note proposes that the intoxication defenses should be
collapsed into a single defense in which involuntary (or negligent)
intoxication may be considered as a mitigating factor.239
For example, in Tennessee v. Wagner, the defendant would
establish extreme intoxication based on police testimony describing
his delusional behavior and the toxicology reports showing am-
phetamine in his system. 240 Therefore, he would be liable for reck-
less, but not intentional or knowing, crimes. If the jury had ac-
cepted Wagner's story that he had been tricked into taking the
methamphetamine, or if they believed that he did not know that the
substance was methamphetamine, but should have known (i.e., was
negligent), they could further reduce his sentence based on the in-
voluntary or negligent intoxication.
This version of the defense, allowing involuntary intoxication
to reduce liability, but not to absolve the defendant's crime, brings
it more in line with the views expressed by the respondents in Rob-
inson and Darley's study.241 Hopefully, this would ultimately result
in greater consideration of involuntary intoxication evidence by
judges and juries.
235. See Hall, supra note 23, at 1054-57.
236. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (noting rarity of using involuntary intoxica-
tion defense).
237. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
240. See Tennessee v. Wagner, C.C.A. No. 02C01-9809-CC-00264, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App.
LEXIS 1344, at *8-11 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 30, 1999); see also supra Part V.C.
241. See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The intoxication defenses are gradually disappearing from
the legal landscape. The Supreme Court's decision in Montana v.
Egelhoff approved Montana's ban on the introduction of intoxication
evidence, thus granting the state governments the power to abridge
the right to present a full criminal defense. 242 Some commentators
contend that Americans will not miss this personal right too
much. 243 This Note, however, takes the position that the intoxica-
tion defenses should not be summarily abandoned. They can be
drafted in such a way that they will be easier to apply and more in
tune with the expectations and intuitions of the layperson.
This Note's proposed revision of the intoxication defenses
improves the currently implemented versions in three significant
ways. First, by establishing a presumption of recklessness in cases
of extreme intoxication, the revision focuses deliberation on evi-
dence of the defendant's intoxication, rather than on speculation
regarding the defendant's debilitated thought processes. Second, by
allowing the defendant's pre-intoxication culpability to rebut the
presumption of recklessness, the revision eliminates the oft-voiced
concern that the intoxication defenses encourage people to become
intoxicated prior to committing criminal acts in order to receive re-
duced liability. Third, by allowing mitigation rather than exculpa-
tion in the case of involuntary intoxication, the revision brings the
defense more in line with the expectations of the layperson. This
proposed revision to the intoxication defenses offers a far better al-
ternative to venturing down the slippery slope of reduced rights
offered by the proponents of Egelhoff.
Meghan Paulk Ingle*
242. See generally 518 U.S. 37 (1996).
243. Commentator Mitchell Keiter noted that eighty-three percent of respondents to a Jus-
tice Department survey considered crime a "very serious threat," while only twenty-six percent
saw police overreaction to crime a "very serious threat," concluding that "it is debatable whether
more Americans fear the 'danger of governmental oppression' or the 'menace of anti-social indi-
vidual action.'" See Keiter, supra note 2, at 515. See generally Layton, supra note 4, at 548 (argu-
ing that "states that disallow voluntary intoxication as an affirmative defense do not pierce the
shield of constitutional protections guaranteed to criminal defendants because the state must
still prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt").
While interning at the Tennessee Supreme Court, I read the William Curtis Wagner
trial transcript and became interested in writing about the intoxication defenses. Therefore, this
Note owes its conception to Jayne Workman who offered me the opportunity to intern at the
Court and to Betsy Garber who introduced me to many interesting legal issues during my time
there. This Note benefited greatly from the hard work of editors Debbie Reule, Sewali Patel,
Russ Miller, and Shay Zeemer; I give them my heartfelt thanks. Finally, I am grateful to my
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husband Rich, who keeps me smiling, and to my son Wyatt, who reminds me that every day is a
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